UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/728
20 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Since the breakdown of the peace process in Rwanda in the wake of the tragic events of 6 April 1994, I have reported to the Security Council on several occasions, repeatedly stressing the need for an urgent and coordinated response by the international community to the genocide which has engulfed that country.

2. The Security Council initially decided, by its resolution 912 (1994) adopted on 21 April 1994, to adjust the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and to reduce its strength to 270 all ranks. However, in my letter of 29 April to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/518), I pointed out that the situation had deteriorated to the point where it had become necessary to consider what further action the Council could take, or authorize Member States to take, in order to contribute to the restoration of law and order, to end the wanton violence and massacres of defenceless civilians and to promote a cease-fire.

3. On the basis of my report of 13 May (S/1994/565), the Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994) on 17 May 1994, authorizing the expansion of the force level of UNAMIR up to 5,500 troops and expanding its mandate to contribute to the security and protection of civilians at risk as well as to provide security and support for humanitarian relief operations. The Council requested me, as a first phase, to immediately bring up to full strength the mechanized infantry battalion already in Rwanda, and further requested me to report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment.

4. On the basis of a further report which I submitted to the Security Council on 31 May (S/1994/640), following the visit of a special mission from Headquarters to Rwanda, the Council adopted resolution 925 (1994) on 8 June 1994, in which it endorsed my proposals for the simultaneous deployment of the first and second phases of the expanded operation and for the continuation of urgent preparations for the deployment of the third phase. As of 18 June, UNAMIR consisted of a total force of 503 all ranks (354 troops, 25 military staff personnel and 124 military observers) under the command of Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire. Two Canadian C-130 aircraft are also supporting the mission. I must again reiterate my admiration for the dedication and courage of all UNAMIR personnel, despite serious casualties.

5. In anticipation of the expansion of the mandate of UNAMIR, I had written, on 30 April, to a number of Heads of State in Africa to encourage them to provide troops, and to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), asking him to support my requests. I pursued my efforts through numerous contacts with Heads of State and Government during my visit to South Africa in early May, and with African leaders at the OAU Summit conference in Tunis earlier this month. At the same time, the Secretariat had already commenced efforts to secure the equipment and troops required by UNAMIR for the implementation of the first and second phases. Accordingly, over 50 potential contributing countries were approached.

6. To date, the United Nations has received offers for the following:

- Ethiopia: motorized infantry battalion (fully equipped);
- Ghana: mechanized infantry battalion (offer not yet confirmed and made on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Senegal: mechanized infantry battalion (offer not yet confirmed and made on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Zambia: motorized infantry battalion (on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Zimbabwe: motorized infantry battalion (on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Congo: infantry company (on the condition that it be fully equipped);
- Malawi: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Mali: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Nigeria: infantry company (on the condition that its equipment requirements are met);
- Italy: 1 aircraft (most probably C-130, not to fly into Rwandese airspace);
- Netherlands: 1 Fokker 27 aircraft (not to fly into Rwandese airspace);
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 50 trucks for infantry and cargo;
- United States of America: 50 armoured personnel carriers (APCs);
- France, on a bilateral basis, has offered 20 million French francs to Senegal to cover the equipment requirements of 200 men.

7. Some countries have indicated an interest, but have not yet made commitments, to provide the following:

- Australia: 1 medical company;
- Canada: a communication company;
- Italy: 20 water/fuel trucks;
- Romania: a surgical team;
- Russian Federation: 8 transport helicopters and a number of heavy transport cargo aircraft.

8. On the basis of the offers for troops and equipment received so far, and of the discussions between the Secretariat and the Governments concerned, the United Nations expects, in the best of circumstances, to complete the deployment of the first phase of UNAMIR in the first week of July 1994. This envisages bringing the depleted battalion presently in Kigali to its full strength, for which confirmation of the offer from Ghana is expected. Meanwhile, 10 APCs, which are being transferred from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), have already started arriving in Rwanda as part of the deployment of the first phase. In addition, the United States will start airlifting 50 APCs to Entebbe, Uganda, on 24 June.

9. The deployment schedule for the second phase of the expanded operation, which was intended to be synchronized with the first phase, cannot be determined at this time. Final confirmations of the resources required, namely two infantry battalions, a communications unit and other logistic support, have not yet been received from the Governments concerned. Moreover, the Secretariat has still not been able to secure offers for medical and other support units. In the absence of firm commitments for military logistic units, it will be necessary to seek a civilian contractor on an emergency basis. Such a contractual alternative already exists within UNOSOM II and it would be extended to UNAMIR until the necessary logistic support from Governments can be secured.

10. In the conditions prevailing in Rwanda, it is clear that additional troops can only be deployed once the necessary equipment to support them is on the ground and after the troops have been trained to use the equipment with which they may not be familiar. It also is noteworthy that, although Governments are expected to offer fully trained and equipped units for United Nations operations, almost all offers received from Governments are conditional in one way or another. The difficulties that the Secretariat has faced in securing resources for UNAMIR's expanded mandate show that there is no guarantee that the stipulated conditions can be met. Even if they can, protracted negotiations will be required, not only with the Governments making these conditional offers, but also with other Member States. In this context, it should be noted that none of those Governments possessing the capacity to provide fully trained and equipped military units have offered so far to do so for the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions to deal with the situation in Rwanda.

11. In the light of the above, it is evident that, with the failure of Member States to promptly provide the resources necessary for the implementation of its expanded mandate, UNAMIR may not be in a position, for about three months, to fully undertake the tasks entrusted to it by those resolutions. Meanwhile, the situation in Rwanda has continued to deteriorate and the killing of innocent civilians has not been stopped. Furthermore, the parties have not yet come to an agreement for a cease-fire in the talks under UNAMIR auspices, nor have they respected the cease-fire to which they agreed at the recent OAU summit in Tunis.

12. In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider the offer of the Government of France to undertake, subject to Security Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational operation in conjunction with other Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. Such an operation was one of the options envisaged in my letter of 29 April (S/1994/518) and a precedent exists for it in the United States-led operation Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF) which was deployed in Somalia in December 1992. If the Council decides to authorize an operation on these lines, I consider it would be necessary for it to request the Governments concerned to commit themselves to maintain their troops in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength to take over from the multinational force and the latter has created conditions in which a peace-keeping force operating under Chapter VI of the Charter would have the capacity to carry out its mandate. This would imply that the multinational force should remain deployed for a minimum period of three months.

13. The activities of the multinational force and UNAMIR would be closely coordinated by the respective force commanders, who would take into account the fact that the former would be operating under Chapter VII of the Charter. UNAMIR would continue to fulfil, to the extent permitted by the resources made available to it, its mandated responsibilities in and around Kigali and at the airport. It would also continue to assist in providing support for the delivery of humanitarian aid to accessible areas. During this period, UNAMIR would operate on the assumption that the parties will cooperate with the activities of the mission. However, in the event that the safety and security of UNAMIR personnel were to be jeopardized, I would immediately reassess the situation and make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council.

14. It is self-evident that the efforts by the international community to restore stability in Rwanda, both by halting the genocide and by securing a cease-fire, are directed to a resumption of the Arusha peace process. In this connection, as the Security Council is aware, my new Special Representative for Rwanda, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan, plans to take up his assignment shortly.

15. I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Security Council

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S/1994/729
20 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CSCE MINSK CONFERENCE AND OF THE CSCE MINSK GROUP

The members of the Security Council have asked me to thank you for your letter to me of 9 June 1994 (S/1994/687) reporting on efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic. They would like to reaffirm their support for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mediation efforts, as expressed in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and for your work to further integrate these efforts and those of the Russian Federation.

(Signed) Salim Bin Mohammed AL-KHUSSAIBY
President of the Security Council

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/730
21 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Enclosed herewith is a statement made on 17 June 1994 by the Official Spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue.

I should be grateful if the text of this letter and its enclosure were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. H. ANSARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 17 June 1994 by the Spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of India

We have been closely following the developments in the Korean peninsula. We trust that all the parties concerned will exercise the maximum restraint so that peace and tranquillity can be maintained in the region, and existing tensions can be eliminated.

We follow with great interest the current mission being undertaken by former President Jimmy Carter of the United States of America and hope that the positive first steps which have been achieved can be further built upon.

India abstained on the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency last week, our view being that punitive measures adopted in the United Nations or elsewhere could exacerbate matters at this stage, making a resolution of the issues more difficult. We hope that negotiations will continue, through which a way will be found to peacefully resolve this crisis.

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/731
21 June 1994.

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 6 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NORWAY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) concerning the expansion of the embargo against Haiti, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the amended Norwegian national regulations* relating to the implementation of Security Council resolution 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993 and the implementation of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994.

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* The text of regulations may be consulted in room S-3545.

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UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1994/732
21 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 21 June 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning a peace-keeping operation by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) within the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Y. VORONTSOV

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Annex

Letter dated 21 June 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General

As you are well aware, the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, still remains extremely tense and carries the risk of further bloodshed. The fact that there is still no solution to the problem of over 250,000 refugees and displaced persons creates a climate in which nothing can be ruled out, not even acts of destabilization by elements not under the control of the parties.

No one in the international community is likely to challenge the view that a peace-keeping operation to help avert a possible resumption of hostilities is indispensable. With the support of the Russian Federation, your Special Envoy, Ambassador Brunner, has for many months been engaged in initiatives aimed, inter alia, at creating the conditions for such a peace-keeping operation.

In your report of 3 May 1994 (S/1994/529), you note that the appropriate conditions have not been fulfilled for a recommendation to the Security Council to decide at this stage to establish a United Nations peace-keeping force for Abkhazia. However, the time factor as far as the deployment of such an operation is concerned has today become critical in regard to peace and security, and in regard to the conditions necessary for further movement towards a political settlement.

On 14 May 1994, the Georgian and Abkhaz parties signed the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces in Moscow. Among other things, the Agreement includes an appeal to the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States to take a decision on the use of a collective peace-keeping force within the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Moreover, the parties addressed special appeals to the President of the Council, and President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin.

Acting on the basis of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, CIS has decided to introduce a collective force into the conflict zone for a period of six months, with an advance contingent being deployed immediately and consisting of Russian troops present in Abkhazia. The Security Council will of course always be kept fully informed of the size of such forces and of their activities, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter.

CIS is anxious not to supplant the United Nations, but to help create the most favourable conditions for the efforts of the United Nations. It is therefore essential to establish from the very outset close cooperation between the peace-keeping force and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). We hope that the Security Council will decide to enlarge the staff of the Mission and expand and refine its mandate.

We trust that the international community will welcome this CIS initiative, especially as it is consistent with one of the options presented to you. The establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations, of a special fund for

voluntary contributions would help to attract a wide range of States to the peace-keeping effort.

We assume that, at the same time, the United Nations should continue its active efforts to mediate with a view to finding a comprehensive political settlement in Abkhazia. For its part, the Russian Federation remains prepared as usual to lend its full support.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. KOZYREV

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General Assembly
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A/49/183
S/1994/733
21 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 104 (c) of the preliminary list*
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 20 June 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the forcible eviction and resettlement of Serbs and Montenegrins in Albania.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 104 (c) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

ANNEX

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 17 June 1994

The Yugoslav public is concerned over the information that Albanian authorities attempted to forcibly evict the members of the Serb and Montenegrin minority - Vracani and Podgoricani - from the villages of Stari and Mladi Boric in which they have lived from time immemorial. According to the available information, Albanian authorities tried to take over their houses and land by force and to resettle them in other localities.

Of particular concern is the fact that the Albanian Police used force in this attempt, injuring a number of persons, women and children among them. This act provoked wide concern among the members of the Serb and Montenegrin minority and Goranci as yet another piece of evidence of the escalation, pressure and lack of readiness of Albanian authorities to recognize and respect the inalienable rights of national minorities in their territory.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out with concern the fact that Albania has been forcibly resettling the members of the Serb and Montenegrin minority under the pretext of a new administrative division of the State territory, the aim of which is to settle Albanians from the regions of Dukadjin and Malessia on the property of Serbs, Montenegrins and Goranci. This is a calculated policy, aimed at breaking up the ethnic compactness of Serbs, Montenegrins and Goranci in Albania, especially in the territory towards the Yugoslav-Albanian border, at stepping up physical and psychological pressure on them and accelerating in that way their systematic assimilation.

By such behaviour Albanian authorities flagrantly violate human and civic rights - the right to physical integrity, free choice of place of residence and the inviolability of personal and private property - which is in flagrant contravention of Albania's commitments as a State Member of the United Nations and member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls on Albanian authorities to stop the pressure against the members of the Serb and Montenegrin national minority and against Goranci and to desist from the plan on the forcible resettlement of Vracani and Podgoricani. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects Albania to respect the rights of the members of the Serb and Montenegrin national minority in accordance with its obligations under the relevant documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

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S/1994/734
21 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 20 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The humanitarian situation in Rwanda is an ongoing disaster. The cease-fire is not being respected by the parties, and massacres of civilians are continuing on a large scale.

Security Council resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994) give the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) a mandate to intervene in order to put an end to this humanitarian catastrophe. France and Senegal fully subscribe to the objectives and methods advocated in those two resolutions.

No doubt, however, it will take some more time before UNAMIR as expanded in accordance with those resolutions can be operational; it will not be possible to transport and make operational the contingents to be supplied by States, and their equipment, until several weeks from now. This delay is liable to cost more thousands of lives in Rwanda and cause a geographical expansion of the area affected by the tragedy.

Against that background, the Governments of France and Senegal are prepared to send a force in without delay, so as to maintain a presence pending the arrival of the expanded UNAMIR. They are in contact with other Member States likely to join the operation. The objectives assigned to that force would be the same ones assigned to UNAMIR by the Security Council, i.e. contributing to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians in danger in Rwanda, by means including the establishment and maintenance, where possible, of safe humanitarian areas. That objective naturally excludes any interference in the development of the balance of military forces between the parties involved in the conflict.

In the spirit of resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, our Governments would like, as a legal framework for their intervention, a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations giving them a mandate to act until the expanded UNAMIR is deployed. As we see it, the interim force should be able to withdraw towards the middle of August at the latest, after handing over to UNAMIR when its reinforcements have been deployed.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/1994/735
21 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to my letter dated 10 June 1994 (S/1994/693), I would once again urge the Security Council to seriously examine and address the persistent ethnic cleansing campaign in the Banja Luka region, perpetrated by de facto Serbian authorities, which has been continuing without any sign of abating.

According to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sources, Serb extremists in Banja Luka and its surroundings continue to force non-Serbs to flee the region, while those Serbs opposed to these policies remain helpless to intervene. The Serb de facto authorities have employed a variety of tactics, including:

(a) Murder;

(b) Rape;

(c) Fire-bombings and demolition of houses;

(d) Arbitrary imprisonment usually accompanied by beatings or torture;

(e) Physical intimidation and harassment;

(f) Dismissal from jobs ("only 3 per cent of non-Serbs continue to hold employment within the territories administered by the Bosnian Serbs") (sixth periodic report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia (S/1994/265, annex, appendix, para. 9)).

Of particular concern to my Government is that the hate manifested in ethnic cleansing is being instilled in innocent youths. According to "Information Notes on Former Yugoslavia", No. 5/94 of May 1994, published by the UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy for Former Yugoslavia, "a new problem for Muslims in Vrbanja is Serb children (between 10 and 14 years of age) who now go to school carrying hand-grenades, scaring Muslim children". The international community has offered no response to mitigate these actions, and it is little wonder that less than 9 per cent of the original non-Serb population remains in the area.

Furthermore, according to the Special Rapporteur (S/1994/265), de facto Serb authorities have established a "housing agency" which forcibly evicts non-Serbs from their homes or apartments and introduces Serb settlers to the vacated premises. Independent international observers verify that many of these settlers are from Serbia and Montenegro proper, reaffirming the conclusion of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that "links existed between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serbian militias and paramilitary groups responsible for massive, gross and systematic violations of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatian territories controlled by Serbs" (A/48/18, para. 537) as well as the observation contained in the final report of the Commission of Experts that "JNA and the Army of the so-called 'Bosnian Serb Republic' have been involved in carrying out and facilitating the policy and practices of 'ethnic cleansing' in certain parts of the territory" (S/1994/674, annex, para. 141 (a)).

While these practices are obviously in gross violation of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions as well as the Geneva Conventions, the international community should be careful not to overlook that allowing these practices to continue directly jeopardizes chances for a settlement in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These actions are in clear violation of the 8 June cease-fire, brokered by the United Nations and solemnly agreed to by my Government and Dr. Karadzic. It is difficult to expect a successful conclusion of the negotiating process while, concurrent with it, clear-cut crimes against humanity are being committed. We would again urge the Security Council to take measures, including the establishment of an international presence and/or a fact-finding mission in the region, either independently or in coordination with relevant regional organizations to put an end to these abhorrent practices.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/1994/736
21 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May, which requested Member States to report on the measures they had instituted for meeting their obligations contained in resolution 917 (1994) and earlier relevant resolutions, namely, resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993 and 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, imposing sanctions on Haiti, I have the honour to transmit to you a report from the Government of Australia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Richard BUTLER

Annex

Statement made on 17 June 1994 by the Government of Australia pursuant to Security Council resolution 917 (1994) concerning sanctions against Haiti

Pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994, which requested States to report on the measures they had instituted for meeting the obligations contained in resolution 917 (1994) and earlier relevant resolutions, namely, resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993 and 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, the Government of Australia has the honour to submit the following.

Financial measures

Regulations have been made under the Charter of the United Nations Act, effective as at 8 June 1994, which implement the financial sanctions imposed under paragraph 8 of resolution 841 (1993) and paragraph 4 of resolution 917 (1994) (and taking into account paragraph 2 of resolution 873 (1993)). The Reserve Bank of Australia will be issuing notices shortly under the Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations to inform banks and exchange dealers of the measures.

Trade measures

Amendments have been made to the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations and Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations, effective as at 8 June 1994, which implement the wide-ranging trade sanctions imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 841 (1993) and paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 917 (1994) (and taking into account paragraph 7 of resolution 841 (1993), paragraph 3 of resolution 873 (1993) and paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 917 (1994)).

Regulations have also been made under the Charter of the United Nations Act, effective as at 8 June, to cover the activities of Australian citizens outside the Australian jurisdiction.

Immigration measures

Amendments have been made to regulations under the Migration Act, effective as at 2 June 1994, to implement paragraph 3 of resolution 917 (1994).

Civil aviation measures

Amendments have been made to the Air Navigation Regulations, effective as at 1 June 1994, to implement paragraph 2 of resolution 917 (1994).

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S/1994/737
21 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

France: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 and 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, which set out the mandate and force level of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Determined to contribute to the resumption of the process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Rwanda to continue and redouble their efforts at the national, regional and international levels to promote these objectives,

Stressing the importance of the cooperation of all parties for the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda,

Having considered the letter of the Secretary-General of 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728),

Taking into account the time needed to gather the necessary resources for the effective deployment of UNAMIR, as expanded in resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994),

Noting the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda (S/1994/734), and stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between the parties,

Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and neighbouring States to bring peace to Rwanda,

Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of the civilian population in Rwanda,

Recognizing that the current situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community,

Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728) and agrees that a multinational operation may be set up for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength;

2. Welcomes also the offer by Member States (S/1994/734) to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda through the establishment of a temporary operation under national command and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, on the understanding that the costs of implementing the offer will be borne by the Member States concerned;

3. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 925 (1994);

4. Decides that the mission of Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General will be limited to a period of two months following the adoption of the present resolution, unless the Secretary-General determines at an earlier date that the expanded UNAMIR is able to carry out its mandate;

5. Commends the offers already made by Member States of troops for the expanded UNAMIR;

6. Calls upon all Member States to respond urgently to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support, in order to enable expanded UNAMIR to fulfil its mandate effectively as soon as possible and requests the Secretary-General to identify and coordinate the supply of the essential equipment required by troops committed to the expanded UNAMIR;

7. Welcomes, in this respect, the offers already made by Member States of equipment for troop contributors to UNAMIR and calls on other Members to offer such support, including the possibility of comprehensive provision of equipment to specific troop contributors, to speed UNAMIR's expanded force deployment;

8. Requests Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to coordinate closely with UNAMIR and also requests the Secretary-General to set up appropriate mechanisms to this end;

9. Demands that all parties to the conflict and others concerned immediately bring to an end all killings of civilian populations in areas under

their control and allow Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to implement fully the mission set forth in paragraph 3 above;

10. Requests the States concerned and the Secretary-General, as appropriate, to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this operation and the progress made towards the fulfilment of the objectives referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above;

11. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress made towards completing the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR within the framework of the report due no later than 9 August 1994 under paragraph 17 of resolution 925 (1994), as well as on progress towards the resumption of the process of political settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/738
21 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request, under rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a formal meeting of the Security Council immediately following the informal consultations scheduled for 22 June 1994 at 11 a.m., in order to put to the vote the draft resolution (S/1994/737) on the situation in Rwanda which was circulated in blue tonight.

I should be grateful if you could circulate this letter without delay to all members as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-25938 (E) 210694 210694 22/06/94

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
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S/1994/739
22 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 14 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, referring to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994), has the honour to provide him with the following information.

Security Council resolution 917 (1994) has been transmitted to all relevant national authorities and its terms and provisions entered into effect throughout the national territory on 21 May 1994.

94-25986 (E) 220694

220694

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
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S/1994/740
20 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 922 (1994) of 31 May 1994, in which the Council requested me to submit to it, as soon as there was progress, and in any case by 30 June 1994, a report on the Lusaka peace talks. I was further requested to state whether the parties continued to demonstrate the necessary political will to achieve a lasting peace and to make recommendations for the future United Nations presence in Angola. Since then, the members of the Council, in their informal consultations, have been regularly informed of developments with respect to the situation in Angola.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. In its resolution 922 (1994), the Security Council reiterated its strong appeal to the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) to show the good faith and flexibility needed to reach an early and comprehensive settlement at the Lusaka peace talks. In that regard, the Council welcomed the formal acceptance by the Angolan Government of the proposals put forward by UNAVEM II and the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America) regarding UNITA's participation in the management of State affairs and urged UNITA to do likewise. In the same spirit, the Council encouraged the Government and UNITA to finalize outstanding details without further procrastination to allow the successful conclusion of the Lusaka peace talks. Moreover, the Council, while noting with grave concern the resurgence of military operations throughout the territory of Angola as well as the worsening of the humanitarian situation, reiterated its demand that both parties cease immediately all offensive military operations and condemned acts that imperilled humanitarian relief efforts.

3. The agenda item on national reconciliation has been under discussion at the Lusaka peace talks since 31 January 1994. Following an agreement on 17 February 1994 on the general principles pertaining to that question, the proceedings at Lusaka have focused on the specific principles and on the modalities for their implementation.

4. Since my last report to the Security Council, of 24 May 1994 (S/1994/611), considerable progress has been achieved on the specific principles. At the time of that report, 6 of the original 18 specific principles had still to be agreed upon. Currently, only one specific principle remains to be agreed, namely the provision of appropriate facilities to UNITA, including adequate residences for its senior leaders.

5. As regards the modalities, the three which are most contentious pertain to UNITA's participation in the management of State affairs; the re-establishment of State administration throughout Angola; and the future status of the President of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi.

6. The first of these raises important questions relating to the allocation of senior Government posts to UNITA, including the governorships of provinces. It has been under discussion at the Lusaka peace talks since February 1994. After intensive consultations, the United Nations and the observer States put forward a number of proposals which were accepted by the Government on 28 May 1994. On the same day, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, transmitted the proposals to the UNITA delegation.

7. On 8 June 1994, UNITA gave a generally positive response to the proposals. It accepted all of them which relate to the number and the identity of the posts to be occupied by its senior members, including those in diplomatic missions. However, with regard to the posts of governor, UNITA requested the additional position of Governor of Huambo. It also suggested that one of its members occupy the post of Deputy Governor of Malange, instead of Deputy Governor of Huambo.

8. My Special Representative, supported by the representatives of the observer States, has pointed out to the UNITA delegation that the proposals constitute an indivisible package, alteration of which could place in jeopardy months of negotiations. He has therefore urged UNITA to accept the proposals in their entirety, as the Government has done, pointing out that UNITA has been offered the posts of Deputy Governor and Municipal Administrator of Huambo. In this context, my Special Representative, accompanied by the representatives of the three observer States, travelled to Huambo on 18 June 1994 and held talks with Mr. Savimbi. The following day, he met in Luanda with President José Eduardo dos Santos.

9. Once the remaining issues relating to national reconciliation are resolved, the last item on the agenda, namely the future mandate of the United Nations in Angola and the role of the observer States, is not expected to present major difficulties or to take a great deal of time since a measure of agreement has already been reached on it. It will be essentially a matter of recapitulating the different roles which in the past the Government and UNITA have agreed to entrust to the United Nations and of reconciling the contents of the Lusaka Protocol with standard practices followed by the Organization in establishing peace-keeping operations.

III. MILITARY SITUATION AND THE STATUS OF UNAVEM II

10. Since my last report to the Security Council, fighting in Angola has continued to escalate and has affected 11 of the 18 provinces. Both the Government and UNITA have increased their offensive military actions, particularly in and around the provincial capitals of Huambo, Kuito and Malange. As negotiations in Lusaka continued, the two sides maintained their attempts to gain advantage on the ground and to consolidate positions. The fighting has caused further loss of life and damage to basic infrastructures and has hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid to many parts of the country.

11. According to reports, UNITA has persistently infiltrated Kwanza Sul, conducting guerrilla operations in various parts of the province. In late May and early June, intense combat took place around the town of Ebo, which is presently under the control of the Government. The latter announced that its air force had accidentally bombarded a school near Waku-Kongo, resulting in the deaths of 89 schoolchildren. Officials of the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) believe that UNITA is attempting to capture the strategically located towns of Gabela, Porto Amboim and Sumbe in order to secure access to the sea and that it is determined to consolidate positions in the south-western part of the country.

12. In the meantime, heavy fighting continued intermittently in and around the city of Kuito; both the Government and UNITA have accused each other of initiating hostilities in which hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded. The humanitarian situation in the city remains catastrophic. On 4 June 1994, UNITA launched a major offensive against Malange. This was reportedly repulsed by FAA, but sporadic fighting persisted there. Since late May, UNITA has been concentrating troops around the provincial capital of Luena and in other north-eastern parts of the country.

13. At the same time, the Government air force bombed Huambo on 29 and 30 May, and on 3, 6, 8 and 10 June 1994. As a result, the United Nations and humanitarian staff from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Huambo were forced to seek refuge in reinforced bunkers. UNITA asserted that in addition to the city, air strikes were conducted against several smaller towns and villages in the region and that hundreds of civilians were wounded or killed. In Lunda Norte Province, the areas of Cafunfo and Luremo were also reportedly the targets of aerial bombardments. While there were reports that FAA was conducting military operations in the northern parts of Cabinda, an FAA offensive was also aimed at the north-western part of the country to recapture the oil-producing area around Soyo.

14. Both the Government and UNITA appear to be determined to achieve their military objectives. In addition to taking a heavy toll on the civilian population, the escalation of fighting has had repercussions on the political situation and threatens the peace process.

15. In several previous reports, the Security Council has been informed about my efforts to develop a comprehensive contingency plan in anticipation of major progress in the Lusaka peace talks. During the period under review, the concept of an expanded operation has been further refined and existing guidelines have been updated. An agenda has been formulated for the meeting of the Chiefs of

Staff of FAA and UNITA which is scheduled to take place after the initialling of an agreement in Lusaka. In the meantime, a reconnaissance plan has been prepared for the selection of priority deployment sites for United Nations teams, quartering areas and storage facilities for weapons and ammunition. The Secretariat, together with UNAVEM II and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH), is proceeding with an in-depth study of issues relating to quartering, demobilization, social reintegration and other essential elements of the peace process. I intend to pursue actively all relevant preparatory work, including contacts with potential contributors of troops and police.

16. There has been no change in the current status and mandate of UNAVEM II as set out in paragraph 14 of my last report to the Council (S/1994/611). In my view, the presence of the Mission in Angola remains an important factor in the strenuous effort to reach a political settlement.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

17. The recent intensification of military operations throughout the country has seriously affected the humanitarian assistance programme and threatens the entire effort to stabilize the condition of vulnerable populations. Emergency relief flights to four major locations - Huambo, Kuito, Malange and Uige - have been suspended since late May and stocks of food and other essential humanitarian supplies in these areas are almost exhausted. Relief flights to all destinations in Angola for the week of 13 June were suspended owing to lack of clearance by UNITA. The United Nations has had to evacuate all expatriate staff from Huambo and Kuito, and non-essential staff from Malange, as well as assisting in the evacuation of NGO personnel. On 15 June, UNITA temporarily prevented United Nations staff members and NGO expatriate personnel from leaving Huambo.

18. As a result of these developments, the quantity of relief carried by air has decreased dramatically and conditions are deteriorating rapidly in cities dependent on food supplies delivered by air. Overland transport remains difficult since many roads are mined and security clearance for the use of several main road corridors is granted only sporadically.

19. If military activities continue to affect humanitarian assistance, the significant gains achieved in the relief effort over the past six months will be quickly eroded. In those locations which have been cut off from relief flights since late May, the incidence of starvation and of death and injury to people foraging for food in mined fields has already increased. It is thus imperative that the Government and UNITA cooperate in ensuring the immediate resumption of deliveries to all destinations. The danger of a sharp deterioration of the situation cannot be averted if basic principles of humanitarian law continue to be disregarded.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

20. The General Assembly, by its resolution 48/241 of 5 April 1994, authorized me to enter into commitments at a rate not to exceed US$ 2,098,700 gross (US$ 1,997,000 net) per month during the period from 1 June to 30 September 1994, for the maintenance of UNAVEM II. This authorization is subject to the decision to be taken by the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission. The cost of maintaining UNAVEM II at its current strength will be limited, therefore, to the amount authorized by the General Assembly. In the event of changes in the strength and responsibilities of the Mission during the extension period, any additional resources needed will be sought from the General Assembly.

21. The cash flow situation of the Special Account for UNAVEM II continues to be critical. As of 14 June 1994, outstanding assessed contributions to the UNAVEM II Special Account amounted to some $20.9 million. This represents approximately 11.9 per cent of the total amount assessed on Member States since the inception of the Mission through 30 June 1994. In order to provide UNAVEM II with the necessary cash-flow requirements, loans in a total amount of $24 million have been borrowed from the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund ($19 million) and from the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) ($5 million). These amounts have not been repaid.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

22. Since my last report and the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 922 (1994), the Lusaka peace talks have recorded some positive developments. Agreement has been reached on all but one of the specific principles pertaining to the question of national reconciliation. With respect to UNITA's participation in the management of State affairs, the major problem remains UNITA's insistence on the post of Governor of Huambo.

23. At the time of writing, it is not yet possible to say that both sides have demonstrated the necessary political will to reach a comprehensive peace agreement, although they are probably closer to such an agreement than they have been since implementation of the Bicesse Accords broke down in late 1992. Depending upon the circumstances prevailing when the Security Council meets to examine the present report, the Council may wish to consider the following alternative courses of action:

(a) If UNITA has given an unequivocally positive response to the proposals put forward by UNAVEM II and the observer States on its participation in the management of State affairs, the Council would not for the time being impose the further measures against UNITA provided for in paragraph 26 of its resolution 864 (1993) but would again declare its readiness to consider at any time the adoption of such new measures or to review those currently in force, if developments should so require;

(b) If, on the other hand, UNITA persists in its refusal to accept in their entirety the proposals which the Government has already accepted, the

Council could consider implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 26 of resolution 864 (1993).

24. Given the progress, albeit painfully slow, which is being achieved in the Lusaka peace talks, I trust that the Security Council will remain ready, as stated in its recent resolutions, to consider authorizing promptly an increase in the strength of UNAVEM II. The initial requirement would be the rapid reinforcement of the military and police components to bring their numbers, as well as those of civilian staff, to the levels existing prior to March 1993. In the meantime, I recommend that the present mandate of UNAVEM II be extended for a further three months. If agreement is reached in Lusaka during that period, I will immediately dispatch a reconnaissance mission to Angola to prepare further recommendations to the Council. Needless to say, I will keep the Council regularly informed of any major developments.

25. The military situation continues to be a cause for serious concern. Both sides are intensifying their military operations throughout the country, resulting in heavy casualties, extensive damage to property and further suffering for the Angolan people. It is imperative that all offensive military operations cease forthwith and I recommend that the Security Council renew its urgent call in this sense.

26. Meanwhile, the continuing military operations are having a deplorable effect on the humanitarian situation. I recommend that the Security Council, in addition to urging an immediate suspension of hostilities, press the Government and UNITA to grant immediately security clearances and guarantees for relief deliveries to all locations, and to refrain from any action which could jeopardize the safety of relief personnel or disrupt the distribution of humanitarian assistance to the Angolan people.

27. I once again express my appreciation to the representatives of the three observer States, which are cooperating closely with my Special Representative and rendering him all necessary support. I also pay tribute to my Special Representative, the Chief Military Observer and the staff of UNAVEM II for the determination with which they continue to discharge their duties. I should also like to pay a special tribute to the personnel of United Nations and non-governmental relief organizations who, during the past weeks, have shown an unswerving spirit of self-sacrifice and dedication to their humanitarian mission under extremely hazardous conditions.

UNITED
NATIONS

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S/1994/740/Add.1
29 June 1994

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

Addendum

I. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN ANGOLA

1. In view of the continuing decerioration of the humanitarian situation in Angola since the issuance of my report dated 20 June 1994 (S/1994/740), I wish to provide the Security Council with a more comprehensive account of recent developments and their consequences for the civilian population of the country.

2. The intensification of the war throughout Angola since the end of May 1994 has led to a series of incidents that have gravely affected the safety of relief workers, brought the delivery of relief supplies by air to a complete standstill and by road to a much-reduced level and jeopardized the progress made over the last nine months in stabilizing the condition of the vulnerable population. The number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola has escalated dramatically, and there are now clear signs of rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access is being denied.

3. The incidents leading up to the current situation can be summarized as follows:

(a) The first signs of serious deterioration came in the week of 16 May, when four consecutive security incidents (shelling and shooting) affecting the safe landing of World Food Programme (WFP) relief planes at Malange caused the United Nations to suspend flights temporarily to that provincial capital. In response to the shelling in Malange, the Government of Angola suspended all cargo flights to Huambo and Uíge Provinces;

(b) Despite special high-level discussions between the United Nations and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to resume flights to all areas, and assurances from both sides that cargo flights could resume to Malange, shelling started just as a WFP cargo flight was about to land on 27 May, forcing it to abort landing and return to Luanda. On 31 May, the lives of humanitarian workers were put at great risk when the airport at Malange was shelled immediately after a United Nations light aircraft, authorized by both sides, had landed to collect relief workers.

(c) The start of heavy shelling and fighting in Kuito on 26 May and sporadic serial bombardment of Huambo and its surroundings from 29 May caused further serious difficulties. On 31 May, the Huambo airport was bombed as relief workers were waiting to depart for Luanda. In Kuito, relief workers were trapped in bunkers for eight days before being evacuated by a specially negotiated WFP flight on 4 June;

(d) With the exception of Malange, Kuito, Huambo and Uíge, United Nations relief flights continued according to the normal weekly plan through the beginning of June;

(e) On 10 June, a clearly marked WFP cargo plane with security clearance from both sides was shelled as it was unloading relief items at Balombo, Benguela Province, causing the suspension of further flights to Balombo that day;

(f) On 11 June, UNITA began to place strict limitations on the movement of humanitarian staff based at Huambo to areas outside the city. On 12 June, UNITA refused clearance of the United Nations flight plan for the period from 13 to 19 June, effectively putting a halt to the delivery of food aid and other essential relief items;

(g) On 15 June, when a staff member from a non-governmental organization was evacuated from Huambo for medical reasons, UNITA prevented other United Nations and non-governmental organization staff members from boarding the plane. This restriction was a clear breach of humanitarian law and of an agreement signed between the United Nations and UNITA in December 1993 which states that relief organizations working in UNITA-held territories can have unrestricted movement to carry out their humanitarian programmes. However, on 17 June, as a result of the interventions undertaken by my Special Representative and the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), 23 United Nations and non-governmental organization staff members were flown out of Huambo on a special flight organized by UNAVEM II and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit;

(h) Despite efforts by my Special Representative to obtain clearance from UNITA to send a special flight to Malange to evacuate humanitarian workers, UNITA did not give an early reply and, once again, refused to clear the United Nations flight plan for the period from 20 to 26 June;

(i) On 21 June, despite clearances from UNAVEM II and the Angolan Armed Forces, a 20-truck WFP relief convoy heading towards Bocoio in Benguela Province was attacked by mortar and small arms fire, resulting in the destruction of 15 trucks and their cargo. This incident underlines yet again the prevailing instability throughout most of the country and the difficulty of overland access;

(j) As a result of a United Nations initiative and international pressure on UNITA, on 23 June, an International Committee of the Red Cross plane was cleared to carry out a medical evacuation from Malange of five sick relief workers. However, another 20 relief workers are still there and wish to leave.

Owing to the lack of supplies, they are unable to continue providing assistance for 240,000 beneficiaries in the besieged city.

4. In practice, only a very small part of Angola is currently accessible by air or road for humanitarian work. The humanitarian situation is deteriorating rapidly throughout the country. The effects of the suspension of flights and the increased insecurity will soon be catastrophic. In Kuito, for example, the fighting continues, leading to the deaths of hundreds of civilians and placing hundreds more at immediate risk unless medical supplies can be brought in for treatment. Relief agencies are currently unable to deliver any food supplies to needy beneficiaries in the interior, which is especially critical for the residents and displaced persons trapped in the besieged provincial capitals of Malange, Luena and Menongue. These people will once again face starvation unless relief flights resume before the end of June.

5. Although relief agencies in some locations are able to continue emergency programmes on a limited scale through the use of buffer stocks, a deterioration of the humanitarian situation for the general population, and especially for the vulnerable groups, is already apparent in Malange, Cubal and Kuito. Food stocks are completely exhausted in these locations, and no alternative sources of food are available. It is essential that flights resume to these towns at the earliest opportunity. Other cities, such as Luena, Menongue, Saurimo and Huambo, are also at risk of a rapid deterioration should the suspension of relief flights continue.

6. Furthermore, many other areas affected by the ongoing conflict, such as around the provincial capital of N'Dalatando, have not yet been accessed by humanitarian workers, and countless Angolans, in addition to those already identified as target beneficiaries, are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.

II. OBSERVATIONS

7. As described above, the humanitarian situation in Angola is undergoing a dramatic decline and many thousands of lives are imperilled. Among the main factors contributing to this deterioration is the suspension of relief flights, for which UNITA continues to withhold authorization. I would therefore recommend that the Security Council urge the parties to the conflict, in particular UNITA, to take the necessary action to permit the resumption of humanitarian assistance in all parts of the country.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1994/741
22 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a resolution on the crisis between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its 60th ordinary session, held in Tunisia from 6 to 11 June 1994, and endorsed by the heads of State and Government of OAU at their meeting from 13 to 15 June 1994 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed A. AZWAI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Resolution on the crisis between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its 60th ordinary session, held at Tunis from 6 to 11 June 1994

[Original: Arabic/English]

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its 60th ordinary session at Tunis from 6 to 11 June 1994,

Having heard the statement of the Head of the Delegation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the report of the Secretary-General and the interventions of delegations on the ongoing crisis between the Great Jamahiriya, on the one hand, and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France on the other,

Guided by the principles and objectives of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, which call on member States to refrain from the threat or use of force, to settle their conflicts through peaceful means, to respect the independence of all member States and to refrain from jeopardizing their sovereignty, territorial integrity and the security of their peoples,

Recalling the communiqué issued by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on 6 December 1991 on the American and British threats levelled at the Great Jamahiriya, urging the concerned parties to exercise self-restraint and to seek a solution to the problem through dialogue and peaceful means in compliance with the provisions of international law, to respect the sovereignty of States and to refrain from impeding legal measures,

Referring to resolution 1457 (LVIII) adopted by the Council of Ministers at it 58th session, held at Cairo from 21 to 26 June 1993,

Recalling the communiqué issued by the meeting of the Central Organ for the Prevention, Resolution and Management of Conflicts held at summit level at Cairo on 7 December 1993 that reaffirmed its previous resolution on solidarity with the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in support of its efforts aimed at reaching a peaceful solution to the crisis within the framework of respect for Libyan national sovereignty and the principles of international law,

Taking note of the stand of the Great Jamahiriya which condemns terrorism in all its forms, and denounces those who resort to it or encourage it, and its readiness to cooperate with any regional or international effort to resolve this problem,

Expressing its appreciation for the positive initiatives made by the Great Jamahiriya to solve the ongoing crisis with the three Western States in

accordance with the provisions of international law without compromising respect of its sovereignty,

Expressing its satisfaction at the acceptance by the Great Jamahiriya of Security Council resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992 and its request to the Council to devise a mechanism for its implementation, indicating its full readiness to cooperate in the context of the initiatives and proposals it had made,

Expressing its serious concern over the human and material damages incurred by the Libyan Arab people and neighbouring people from the coercive measures imposed on it in implementation of Security Council resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992,

Expressing its regret at the rejection by the other parties to the conflict of the initiatives made by the Great Jamahiriya and the regional organizations to find a just and impartial solution to its dispute with the three Western States,

Expressing the necessity for a fair and impartial trial to take place in a third country for the truth to come out and to do justice to the victims and their families,

Reaffirming the dangers posed by the continuation of the Lockerbie crisis, without any solution satisfactory to all the parties, for security and peace in Africa, particularly the areas of North Africa and the Mediterranean,

1. Expresses its appreciation for the declaration by the Great Jamahiriya of its repeated condemnation of terrorism and its full readiness to cooperate, in the context of international efforts, with any party fighting terrorism and working to eradicate it, and commends its self-restraint and the sense of responsibility with which it has addressed the crisis;

2. Reaffirms its solidarity with the Great Jamahiriya and recommends that all measures likely to escalate the tension be averted, since they would adversely affect the Libyan Arab people and the neighbouring States;

3. Expresses its grave concern at the escalation of the crisis and the threats of additional sanctions and the use of force as a pattern of relations among States, in violation of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, as well as international laws and norms;

4. Calls on all the parties concerned to commit themselves to the initiatives advocating dialogue and negotiation, with a view to arriving at a peaceful solution to the crisis in conformity with Article 33 of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, which calls for the resolution of conflicts through negotiation, mediation and judicial settlement, and also calls for a just and fair trial of the suspects in a neutral country agreed upon by all the parties concerned;

5. Urges the Security Council to reconsider its resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993 and to lift the embargo imposed on

the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in appreciation of the positive initiatives taken by the Great Jamahiriya in addressing the crisis, and calls on the Council to adopt a new resolution securing a fair trial for the suspects, in a location agreed upon and leading to the uncovering of the truth and doing justice to the victims and their families;

6. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to step up efforts in order to find a rapid solution to this crisis and to report thereon to the next session.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1994/742
20 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION OF HAITI

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of paragraph 16 of resolution 917 (1994), in which it decided that, until the return of the democratically elected President, it would keep under continuous review, at least on a monthly basis, all the measures in resolution 917 and earlier relevant resolutions, and requested that the Secretary-General, having regard for the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), report to the Council on the situation in Haiti, the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, legislative actions including preparations for the legislative elections, the full restoration of democracy in Haiti, the humanitarian situation in that country and the effectiveness of the implementation of sanctions, with the first report not later than 30 June 1994.

2. Since the adoption of resolution 917 (1994) on 6 May 1994, no progress has been made towards the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. On the contrary, tensions have increased as a result of the installation of an illegitimate government, the growing impact of economic sanctions, the continued repression and the humanitarian crisis.

3. The Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces supported the move to replace illegally the legitimate President of Haiti, an attempt that was condemned on 11 May 1994 by the members of the Security Council and by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. Supreme Court Judge Emile Jonassaint, acting as provisional President and Prime Minister, announced that he would be organizing elections by the end of this year and would leave office in February 1995, after the election of a new President in January 1995.

4. The acting Prime Minister of the Constitutional Government, Mr. Robert Malval, has condemned the illegal government of Mr. Jonassaint and called on General Cédras to step down, in conformity with his commitment under the Governors Island Agreement. Haiti's main political parties have also denounced the installation of Mr. Jonassaint as unconstitutional.

5. To consolidate his power, Mr. Jonassaint recently issued a series of statements with the intention of restricting public liberties. He also announced that Haitian people seeking to flee the country for the United States would face punishment and that his regime would enforce a 1980 decree providing for penalties for clandestine emigration. On 11 June, he declared a state of

emergency on the grounds that the nation was facing extreme danger and risks of invasion. A crisis committee is studying measures to be implemented under the state of emergency.

6. Despite the electoral timetable, no legislative action has been taken to prepare for the legislative elections and the Chamber of Deputies, which was due to resume its session on 13 June, has been unable to meet.

7. Having considered the recent developments in Haiti, the Security Council by its resolution 917 (1994), adopted on 6 May 1994, decided, inter alia, to impose additional measures tightening the sanctions against the illegal authorities in that country.

8. The Organization of American States, in its resolution MRE/RES.6/94, unanimously adopted by the session of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on Haiti held on 6 and 7 June 1994, reiterated in paragraph V,2 the need for States members of OAS and the United Nations to support and reinforce such embargo measures as suspension of commercial flights, freezing of assets of the Haitian de facto regime and its supporters, as provided in resolutions MRE/RES.2/91, MRE/RES.3/92 and MRE/RES.4/92, and to suspend international financial transactions with Haiti.

9. Further sanctions have been considered or implemented by individual Member States. In a statement of conclusions issued on 3 June in New York (S/1994/686, annex), the Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti expressed their readiness to consider, on a national basis, additional measures such as suspension of commercial flights and banning international financial transactions. Following that statement, on 10 June, the United States of America banned all commercial flights with Haiti effective 25 June, as well as financial transfers to and from that country. Canada, as well as Panama, also suspended their commercial flights with Haiti.

10. In order to tighten the cordon around the island, the United States deployed two additional navy vessels off Haiti, bringing to eight the number of United States ships working with one Canadian, one Argentine and one Dutch ship. A French vessel is expected to arrive soon. Small United States boats have also been deployed to patrol along the coasts.

11. Steps have also been taken on land to enforce the sanctions mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 917 (1994). In that connection, the Security Council urged the Secretary-General to respond positively to the request of the Dominican Republic for a team of technical experts to assess the situation on its border with Haiti and to make recommendations to the Secretary-General. Accordingly, the Secretary-General dispatched a team of three persons who visited the Dominican Republic from 19 to 24 May 1994 and submitted their report to the Secretary-General on 27 May 1994. On the basis of that report, on 9 June the Secretary-General communicated his observations and recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic. On 15 June, the Committee established by the Security Council under resolution 841 (1993) adopted consolidated guidelines on the conduct of its work together with a comprehensive list of persons falling under the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 917 (1994). The guidelines

were transmitted to all Member States on 21 June for their information and guidance.

12. In a related development, President Balaguer and Mr. Dante Caputo, my Special Representative and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of OAS, indicated, in a joint statement on 1 June, that technical assistance in enforcing the embargo would be provided by several countries, under bilateral arrangements. A maximum of 60 foreign experts would be dispatched to the border and equipment would be provided to ensure control of land and sea traffic.

13. In accordance with paragraph 7 (a) of resolution 917 (1994), President Balaguer has allowed the border with Haiti, which had at first been totally sealed, to be reopened for traffic in foodstuffs and medical supplies. In their statement of conclusions, the Friends of the Secretary-General welcomed the decision by the Dominican Republic and its request for international technical assistance, expressing their readiness to help it in achieving this goal.

14. As to human rights, the situation has deteriorated sharply, with new patterns of repression such as the abduction and rape of family members of political activists. Since the adoption of resolution 917 (1994), 50 politically related killings have been documented by the International Civilian Mission. In a growing number of cases, the implication of members of the Armed Forces, or Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrès (FRAP), has been established. The executions seem consistent with a systematic elimination of members of popular organizations which support the return to constitutional order.

15. The security environment remains highly unstable and incidents have occurred involving Embassy staff and United Nations security officers who have been subject to threats and intimidation from armed civilians as well as from military personnel. Nevertheless, in a press communiqué issued on 13 June, the Ministry of Information stated that all foreigners living in Haiti had the full guarantee that they were safe and might freely go about their activities. On 17 June, however, the regime announced the creation of "strategic no-go areas" from which all foreigners would be banned. These include territorial waters within a 3-mile range, land borders and places where radio antennas are located.

16. The humanitarian situation in Haiti continues to deteriorate in spite of efforts by the United Nations and OAS, non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors. The response to the United Nations/OAS appeal launched in March 1993 has been disappointing: contributions of $9.6 million against identified requirements of $62.7 million. United Nations organizations have had to draw on their core resources to maintain essential programmes. More significantly, however, many donors have contributed either directly or through non-governmental organizations. The total value of humanitarian assistance provided in 1993 is estimated at $68.5 million in the areas of health, food aid, water and sanitation and agriculture. Preliminary indications indicate that this level of activity will be maintained in 1994 if conditions permit. In addition, the United Nations and OAS have initiated a fuel management programme to provide the fuel necessary for the continuation of humanitarian assistance activities.

17. Obstacles have been encountered in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Although exempted from the trade embargo imposed by resolution 917 (1994), imports of essential health products and foodstuffs have decreased considerably and this has affected the stocks available to the humanitarian agencies. There is a scarcity of local currency to pay for local goods. Problems are being encountered with respect to the shipment and internal distribution of relief supplies. The unstable security situation described above also affects humanitarian relief operations.

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23 June 1994

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 37 of Commission resolution 1994/72.

Annex

Letter dated 10 June 1994 by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour of communicating to you an advance copy of another periodic report regarding the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavcia, which I submit pursuant to paragraph 37 of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/72. I would be most grateful if you could arrange for this report to be made available, at your earliest convenience, to the members of the Security Council and to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

(Signed) Tadeusz MAZOWIECKI
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia

Appendix

SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Seventh periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 17 of Commission resolution 1994/72 of 9 March 1994

Situation in Gorazde

1. The enclave of Gorazde, situated in central Bosnia, had a pre-offensive population of some 60-65,000 of whom some 35,000 lived in the town of the same name. The population was and is predominantly Muslim. The enclave is part of the territory of and, until the offensive, was wholly under the control of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 6 May 1993, by Security Council resolution 824 (1993), Gorazde, along with Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa and Bihac, was declared a safe area "free of armed attack". In resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, extended the mandate of UNPROFOR to enable it to deter attacks against the safe areas.

2. The enclave of Gorazde, declared as a "safe area" by resolution of the Security Council, has been subjected to fierce attack by Bosnian Serb forces during the weeks up to late April 1994. The attack involved gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law and resulted in loss of control by government authorities of part of the territory of the "safe area". The Special Rapporteur has already drawn attention to these violations in his letter to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights dated 12 April 1994, and in his special appeal of 22 April 1994. In the letter to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur not only condemned the violations of human rights, calling for their immediate cessation, but also urged all States members of the Commission on Human Rights to use their good offices towards an amelioration of the situation.

3. The Special Rapporteur is aware of a number of incidents of military attacks on civilians, including sniping, throughout the past year. The greatest hardship, however, was caused by persistent interference with passage of humanitarian aid into the enclave. The result of these actions was such that in early January 1994, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees described the situation in Gorazde with respect to the need for aid as one of the worst in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. Before the recent offensive residents of Serbian ethnic origin in the enclave do not appear to have been subjected to any significant level of harassment by the Bosnian Muslim population. Indeed, international observers have pointed to good community relations between Bosnian Serb and Muslim residents. At least one predominantly Serb village, visited by international observers, had been entirely unscathed by the war.

5. The offensive with which this report is primarily concerned was first heralded by military actions in the last days of March 1994, including the blocking of roads into the enclave, refusal to allow passage of convoys and the massing of troops at the edges of the safe area. The enclave was penetrated by Bosnian Serb forces in the area of Lastan and significant military gains were made quickly across the Drina valley. Within days the town of Gorazde came under intense attack, first in the suburbs and then in the centre itself. On 10 April NATO air strikes were launched as "close air support" for the protection of UNPROFOR personnel. A cease-fire was eventually established on 23 April, and forces were obligated to honour a timed withdrawal from military exclusion zones.

6. Following the cease-fire both governmental and Bosnian Serb forces continued to engage in military activity. Serious destruction has been caused during the withdrawal of attacking forces. They have also complicated the programme of medical evacuation from the enclave. According to international sources some 700 people were killed during the offensive and some 1,970 wounded. Deaths are continuing to occur due to sniping and other such incidents. During this and previous offensives, the town of Gorazde suffered damage to some 80 per cent of its buildings.

7. The early stages of the offensive were marked by the overrunning of a number of villages. By 5 March, some 13 had been taken in the Drina valley. The assaults on the villages involved widespread terrorization of the residents, eviction from and destruction of their homes, and the killing of livestock. Eye-witnesses have also attested to the commission of rape by groups of soldiers. The attacks on the villages of Stanici and Kopici are indicative of practices of the advancing troops. In these villages, a number of residents were summarily executed including elderly women and a handicapped man. Bodies of the dead were subsequently mutilated and decapitated. The Special Rapporteur has received information that tank rounds were fired directly into homes. At all stages of the offensive, villagers fled in fear of their lives, leaving behind homes, land and possessions. These people subsequently made their way to the town of Gorazde where there were no resources to meet even the most basic of their needs for shelter and food.

8. The military attacks on the town of Gorazde included numerous and clear violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Attacks included the deliberate targeting of civilian and highly sensitive vulnerable targets like hospitals and interference with attempts to bring care to those who were wounded. Most fatalities were caused by direct mortar and missile fire and shrapnel. Later in the offensive the number of sniper casualties rose.

9. The hospital was deliberately targeted on many occasions, causing heavy loss of life and wounding. The attacks on the hospital also made it impossible for the staff to meet the medical and surgical needs of the patients, many of whom died as a result. It was stated by the attackers that the hospital was in fact a "military command centre" and there were allegations of machine-gun emplacements on the roof and mortar launching equipment on the grounds. International observers, with first-hand knowledge of activities at the hospital, have stated that these allegations were entirely unfounded and that the hospital served no military function during the offensive. Also hit, with heavy loss of life, was a makeshift temporary hospital located in an apartment building. Other highly sensitive civilian targets included a number of refugee centres and the UNHCR warehouse.

10. During fighting the city lost its electricity supply and the water supply was halted by the Bosnian Serbs who gained control of the area surrounding the water station at Usanovic. They subsequently destroyed this facility. Lack of running water obliged people to line up for water at wells, where they were exposed to sniper fire, and many were killed. The water shortage also presented a grave risk to health.

11. International observers present in Gorazde during the attacks have described how many wounded people had to be left untended due to the relentless assaults. They describe the cries of agony which could be heard on the streets for hours at a time. The Special Rapporteur has been informed of the deliberate targeting of vehicles employed in the ferrying of wounded people to the hospital.

12. It may be noted that the attack on the town of Gorazde involved the use of weapons of great destructive force. These included "aerosol bombs" and wire-guided missiles. An attack on the Vitkovici chemical plant resulted in risk of damage to the health of people and livestock and environmental damage following the piercing of containers of ammonium nitrate. Attacks prevented local authorities from effecting repairs to the plant.

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13. A noteworthy feature of the Bosnian Serb offensive was the deliberate targeting of international personnel present in the town and elsewhere in the enclave. It would appear that the buildings housing UNHCR personnel and United Nations military observers were deliberately targeted, such as on 18 April. Also, clearly marked vehicles were targeted as were readily identifiable United Nations personnel in the course of their activities. Targeting of the United Nations military observers building came to be especially sinister in that it also endangered the lives of many individuals who had sought shelter there. A United Nations military observer was killed and his companion grievously wounded in the course of a field trip on 15 April.

14. International personnel also came to face threats to their lives and safety from residents of the enclave. It has been reliably reported that locals, angry with a perceived weak international response to their plight, threatened the international personnel. In particular there were accusations that the international personnel must be issuing misleading information to their headquarters. At a certain stage the local authorities provided some security for the international personnel but this could not be relied on, especially during attacks when the guards sought shelter. On at least one occasion, on 15 April, the guards assumed the role of jailers when they refused to permit two international personnel to participate in a helicopter evacuation from the enclave.

15. The cease-fire did not bring a halt to the violations of human rights. The retreating forces continued to cause havoc. In what international observers described as a "scorched earth" policy they destroyed property both in the suburbs of Gorazde and in outlying villages, and prevented repairs to the water station for some days by means of sniping. There continues to be sniping in a number of locations and United Nations personnel as well as locals have been targeted. Government forces have also engaged in sniping. On 17 May they fatally wounded a Ukrainian soldier attached to UNPROFOR.

16. At Rogatica, Dobrun and elsewhere, convoys which included emergency aid were blocked, delayed or otherwise impeded either by actions of Bosnian Serb authorities or civilians. These interferences undoubtedly increased the suffering of residents of Gorazde. In early May, at a time when 200 patients were crammed into a 40-bed facility, the de facto authorities blocked for six days the deployment of a mobile hospital in Gorazde. Interference also extended to the imposition of complicating and life-threatening delays to the programme of medical evacuation of wounded people, such as an insistence by Bosnian Serb authorities that all incoming and outgoing helicopters land for inspection at Sokolac (in territory controlled by them). In at least one incident at Sokolac Bosnian Serb troops imposed pressure on one Serb evacuee to leave the helicopter, which she did.

17. The present situation of Bosnian Serb residents of the enclave gives cause for concern. The Special Rapporteur has received reports of acts of harassment at the hands of members of the Muslim community and is aware of a perceived fear on the part of local Serbs of escalating levels of such intimidation.

Conclusions

18. It is clear that war crimes have been committed in Gorazde. The perpetrators must be brought to justice.

19. Massive violations of human rights committed by Bosnian Serb forces also occurred. Above all others the rights to life and bodily integrity of residents of the enclave have been treated with contempt. Other rights fundamentally breached include those of property, the right to earn a livelihood, and of personal and family privacy and integrity. The rights of international personnel have also been gravely violated, not least through deliberate targeting.

20. The Special Rapporteur notes that government forces have been responsible for violations of human rights, though to a scale which is not comparable with that of the Bosnian Serb forces. He also notes with concern the indications of emerging animosity on the part of local Muslims against their Serb neighbours.

21. The Special Rapporteur acknowledges the extreme courage of many aid and medical workers in Gorazde. He is aware of the extent to which local and international personnel risked (and, in some cases of local personnel, lost) their lives, in the course of their humanitarian work. He also draws attention to the important service done by international personnel who maintained a steady flow of information out of the enclave throughout the offensive. He recalls that a source of reliable information is the first step towards the reversal of violations of human rights.

Recommendations

22. The Special Rapporteur has long urged that the safe areas be rendered secure and effective. He fully endorses the conclusions of the Secretary-General's report submitted to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 844 (1993)(S/1994/555), in particular "... the safe areas should be defined so that UNPROFOR may provide, within the limit of its resources under the 'light option', effective and credible protection to the population within the area. This in turn requires that the safe areas, described as 'towns and surroundings' in resolution 824 (1993), be clearly delineated, with due regard to the densely populated area" (para. 18).

23. Very many people were displaced during the offensive and at earlier stages of the conflict. All of them, irrespective of their ethnic origins, have a fundamental right to return to their properties and this must be ensured. Accordingly, local authorities should, with all possible assistance from the international community, be in a position to enable all property owners to repossess what is rightfully theirs.

24. It is urged that UNPROFOR retain a strong presence in the enclave to reassure the local population, to reduce risks of further attacks and to monitor closely the treatment of the local Serb minority population.

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LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GHANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I forward herewith a copy of a statement issued by the Government of Ghana on the situation in Rwanda.

It would be appreciated if you could have it circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George O. LAMPTEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

The situation in Rwanda - Ghana's position

The Government of Ghana is gravely concerned that, despite the cease-fire agreement reached in Tunis on 14 June 1994 by the parties to the conflict in Rwanda, the war in Rwanda is still raging on and the state of anarchy and carnage continues, resulting in increasing loss of innocent lives, destruction of property and dislocation of thousands of Rwandese.

The Government of Ghana therefore unreservedly condemns this continuing disregard for human lives and calls upon the international community to be alive to its moral responsibility and take the necessary urgent steps to stop the killing and bring the situation under control.

In this regard, the Government of Ghana would welcome a credible initiative that will have an immediate impact on the tragic situation in Rwanda and create conditions for a peaceful and lasting solution of the Rwanda conflict. Consequently, it is crucial that the neutrality and acceptability of such a mission should be ensured. It is equally important that the mission proceeds under the mandate of the Security Council and with the support of the Organization of African Unity.

Ghana has already declared its willingness to provide additional troops to an expanded presence of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), but on the clear understanding that appropriate equipment and support will be provided to guarantee their effectiveness and the security of their personnel.

In the meantime, we are still committed to the humanitarian operation being undertaken by UNAMIR under the United Nations mandate authorized by the Security Council in its resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994).

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Forty-ninth session
Item 72 of the preliminary list*

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Letter dated 23 June 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Statement by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the escalation of accusations by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia against the Army of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 72 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

ANNEX

Statement issued on 20 June 1994 by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the escalation of accusations by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia against the Army of Yugoslavia

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has noted with concern the escalation of accusations by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia against the Army of Yugoslavia because of alleged violations of its border and provocations of border incidents. Along these lines are also the accusations concerning the alleged concentration of the units of the Army of Yugoslavia in the border area with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the alleged seizure of the "Straza on Cupino Brdo" post by the "Serbian Army".

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs assesses all these accusations as completely unfounded and unacceptable, and rejects them in their entirety.

As early as June 1992, the Army of Yugoslavia took positions and has ever since protected the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the outer line of the cadastral boroughs belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Then, and for some time thereafter, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia never objected to this situation. In carrying out their duties, the units of the Army of Yugoslavia protected the border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and have abided by the rules of service, confining their activity strictly to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The frequent accusations by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for alleged border violations coincide with the arrival of foreign military observers on the Macedonian side of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs assesses that the purpose of the said frequent accusations by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is to back up their claim about the alleged "danger from the north", launched by some non-Balkan and non-European factors as a function of their broader interests. At the same time, such accusations are meant to justify the engagement and increasing presence of foreign military factors in the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of increased pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia's policy towards all its neighbours, including former Yugoslav Republics, is well known and the attempts to present it erroneously, such as those coming from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are contrary to the common interest in developing good-neighbourly cooperation, to peace and security in the Balkans. The policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is based on mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, and, in the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, also on an interest in normalizing relations and restoring the torn links and cooperation. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continues to be strictly committed to the principles of

the inviolability of territory and the non-use of force in the settlement of outstanding issues.

Assessing once again the Macedonian accusations as illogical, unfounded and unacceptable, the Yugoslav side expects the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to stop fabricating such accusations and to harmonize its behaviour with the internationally accepted norms and documents, in the interest of peace, security and good relations.